Database Management Systems (DBMS) 
Introduction
Database Management Systems (DBMS) are a vital component of any information infrastructure and represent the last barrier between private information and malicious individuals. In fact, it is well known that security vulnerabilities are pervasive and that a database server should be securely configured to prevent malicious data access and corruption.
Nowadays, there is a lot of information available on the Internet (provided by several sources and experts) about the main concepts and recommendations that should be employed to create a "securely configured" database environment. However, such recommendations are often vague and suffer from an extreme lack of context. This is a key problem for administrators that have little security experience due to several reasons: they do not know what is the impact of each individual recommendation; they have no way of knowThis work was supported by the Programme AlBan, the European Union Programme of High Level Scholarships for Latin America, scholarship no. E07D403033BR.
ing if a given recommendation is relevant to the particular needs of a given environment; they have no idea of the risks they face by not implementing a particular recommendation; and they do not have a systematic way of identifying the most important recommendations given the needs of a particular environment. This way, a benchmark to evaluate and compare configurations in terms of security is of utmost importance. It is in fact an invaluable tool to help database administrators to become more aware of the security characteristics and concerns of environments they manage.
Several security evaluation methodologies have been proposed in the past [3, 4, 5, 9, 12] . However, most of them are not directed to databases and are very complex to employ as they involve many more aspects than the ones that are directly or indirectly under the control of a database administrator (DBA). In this sense, we define a DBMS configuration as the set of all the elements and features that are influenced by the DBA's decisions. For example, a DBA may decide how to configure the operating system that runs on the machine hosting the DBMS, or decide to place a firewall in the network. However, it is out of his grasp to guarantee that applications that use the database do not have vulnerabilities or to assure the honesty of the staff in charge of the machine maintenance. In these cases, what the DBA can do is to decide how applications interact with the database and minimize the damage that maintenance staff can cause by restricting privileges.
Measuring security is a problem for which no consensual solution has been proposed yet [15] . As a matter of fact, no one knows how to unequivocally assess how secure a system really is. This is partly due to the fact that security has more to do with "what is not known about the system" than with what is known. For instance, the vulnerabilities that make an application insecure are not known until someone explores them. Developers can try to make applications more secure by using development practices that are known to avoid vulnerabilities [10] , but they can never be absolutely sure that no vulnerabilities exist, and, therefore, they will never know how secure the application really is.
Security best practices are the set of general recommendations, which, for a given scenario, are consensually accepted as having the capability to lower the probability of the appearance of vulnerabilities. The use of a software development methodology to prevent vulnerabilities is an example of a security best practice.
Although security is clearly hard to measure, we propose that latent insecurity is not. For example, an application developed in an ad hoc manner, not following any kind of development methodology is typically more prone to have vulnerabilities. In fact, we argue that, even though it is not possible to know if this application is more secure than another one developed using security best practices (e.g., a carefully studied development process and penetration tests), a user should justifiably distrust the first one much more than he should distrust the second one.
In this paper we propose an insecurity metric called minimum untrustworthiness (MU) that measures the minimum level of distrust one should put in a given system or component to act accordingly to its specification. Additionally, we propose an approach to define benchmarks that allows DBAs to systematically compute the minimum untrustworthiness of DBMS configurations. In this case, the MU is defined as: how much distrust should the DBA have (at least) that a given configuration will prevent the manifestation of relevant threats.
The concept of benchmarking can be summarized in three words: representativeness, usefulness, and agreement. A benchmark must be as representative as possible of a given domain but, as an abstraction of that domain, it will always be an imperfect representation of reality. Performance [15] and dependability [16] benchmarking of databases have gained ground and support in the last few years. Nevertheless, security has been largely absent from previous benchmarking effort. Using a rather different approach than previous security assessment tools (and not trustworthiness) [1, 2] , the goal of the proposed untrustworthiness benchmark is to present a useful representation that captures the essential elements through the decomposition of relevant threats and provides practical ways to characterize DBMS configurations in a relative manner through the idea of minimum untrustworthiness.
It is important to emphasize that the complement of minimum untrustworthiness is not trustworthiness. For example, a configuration that has 0% minimum untrustworthiness is not, in any way, 100% trustworthy because several unknown aspects might make the real untrustworthiness of the configuration much higher. What MU estimates is the minimum degree of confidence the DBA should have that his current configuration cannot be trusted.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the characteristics that an untrustworthy benchmark have, and how it could usefully applied in the field. Section 3 presents a detailed discussion about the definition of the benchmark components. Section 4 presents a preliminary benchmark example and the benchmark results over four real database installations. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Benchmarking untrustworthiness
Our proposal to benchmark the minimum untrustworthiness of DBMS configurations is based on the following components:
• A comprehensive set of security best practices for DBMS configurations, consensually ordered based on the opinions of several security experts about the relative importance of implementing each best practice;
• A set of relevant threat vectors that was defined based on the most important DBMS threats found in the field; • A mapping between the configuration elements behind each security best practice and the threats that are mitigated by that best practice; • A set of guidelines on how to compute the minimum untrustworthiness of the configuration and the minimum untrustworthiness for each threat vector. Defining a benchmark to measure and compare untrustworthiness of DBMS configurations is complicated by the extremely large number of possible scenarios where a DBMS can be used. This way, to make the problem solvable we need to define the assumptions that support the definition of the benchmark components. In the present work we considered the following assumptions: 1. The environment is composed by one relational DBMS engine running over a platform composed by an operating system (OS) on top of a single physical machine; 2. The DBA is the overall administrator of the environment, and either there is only one DBA or several DBAs act as a unity (by making consensual choices for the system configuration); 3. The platform is connected to a local area network (LAN) and the DBMS may be accessed locally (from the same machine) or through that network. The LAN may have a connection to the internet; 4. Threats always come from real individuals, which might or might not have a legitimate relation with the system. Real individuals always interact with the system through userids verified by an authentication procedure. Userids belong to one of the following interaction classes: 1) an application userid that authenticates and interacts with the system through a database application and whose actions are restricted by application' rules; 2) an OS userid that authenticates directly on the OS and that is restricted by the OS environment; or 3) a DBMS use-rid that authenticates using the DBMS authentication facilities and that is restricted by the DBMS configuration. The above assumptions hold for many database systems in the field. Obviously, we could also consider other scenarios with alternative assumptions, including: DBMS replicas, applications using more than one DBMS engine, multiple DBAs and operating systems running inside virtual machines, etc. Nevertheless, it would be quite straightforward to consider such modifications during the benchmark definition, as it will become clear in Section 3 where we present the definition of the benchmark components.
It is important to emphasize that the minimum untrustworthiness is a metric related to confidence, which is something that may vary from one individual to another. This way, the MU of DBMS configurations needs to be defined from the point of view of the DBA, and the MU of different configuration scenarios can only be compared when measured by the same person.
The MU computation should take into consideration two different dimensions: the most relevant threat vectors related to DBMS environments and the interaction classes of userids. These two dimensions give the DBA the flexibility to focus on the areas of the system that are more important for him. To better understand how a DBA would use these dimensions to adequately apply the benchmark results to his environment, lets consider two different, but quite common scenarios:
• Scenario A: in this scenario, the DBMS used is a MySQL engine over a Linux system. The operating system also hosts an Apache web server, which runs a single application developed in PHP that connects locally to the database. The system is maintained by a single person that is also the DBA and the developer of the application (i.e., no other person has a valid userid on the DBMS or on the operating system). All application users connect through the application using a web browser and communicate using the https protocol for security.
• Scenario B: in this scenario, a dedicated machine hosts a SQL Server DBMS engine over a Windows 2003 operating system. The DBMS is accessed directly by several stand-alone applications developed using the Delphi language. Applications run on client hosts spread around the LAN and on another machine that hosts an Internet Information Services web server and several ASP web applications that are accessed through the Internet. A large team of developers has DBMS userids with a variety of roles and privileges, and a maintenance staff executes nightly backup procedures using operating systems and DBMS userids. Each DBA executes the benchmark and computes the corresponding levels of minimum untrustworthiness in regard to each threat vector and each interaction class. The DBAs can then focus on the values that make sense for each case. For example, in scenario A threats related to communications channels are very unlikely to be a concern because communication with the database occurs only through the web server and it is protected by the secure HTTPS protocol. At the same time, the DBA does not have to worry about regular operating systems users causing problems because he is the only OS user. So he might decide not to waste time by fixing file privileges on the file system. He should be, however, very concerned with application bugs (e.g., SQL Injection vulnerabilities) that would allow for a non-system user to obtain private information. Additionally, he should also worry about the availability of the database application.
The concerns of the DBA of scenario B are obviously quite different. With so many developers he must be sure that he does not lose the control of privileges within the DBMS. He also is demanded to always have available reports about unusual system behaviors and he must be able to pinpoint possible suspects when attacks happen. Concurrently, he should assume that several individuals he cannot trust wander around the operating system, so he should minimize the consequences of a disgruntled maintenance staff or even his carelessness about his passwords. He should also realize that the local network is very complex and insecure, and that connections between the remote clients and the database should be securely protected.
In both scenarios, the dimensions to analyze the benchmark results allow the DBAs to prioritize the areas that are more important to be considered for security revisions (i.e. dimensions where the configuration is more justifiably untrustworthy). This might also allow the DBA to justify the need for replacing specific elements. For instance, if in a particular DBMS engine it is too hard to obtain auditing information and that should be a top priority in the specific environment it is being used, then the DBA should consider changing to another engine. The same reasoning applies to an operating system that makes it hard to keep file systems permissions organized, or that has vulnerabilities being frequently disclosed. Whenever a DBA justifiably distrusts such aspects by being supported by a systematic evaluation approach (like the proposed benchmark), then there is a good justification to engage in such radical environment modifications.
Building a untrustworthiness benchmark for DBMS configurations
To build the untrustworthiness benchmark we need to carefully define a set of benchmark components. In this section we explain each component (and the approach used to define it), including the set of security best practices and their consensual relative importance, the definition of the relevant threat vectors, the mapping between configuration elements and threats, and the general benchmark execution rules.
Defining security best practices
Defining security best practices is a complex task. Obviously, it is very hard for a single person (even for a security expert) to exhaustively enumerate all relevant security recommendations applicable to a particular DBMS. To be useful, our benchmark must be applicable to any relational DBMS engine. This way, the security best practices should be gathered from several different sources in order to be comprehensive and portable to as many DBMS engines as possible.
Today, it is possible to find a large quantity of security recommendations for databases in the form of books, web pages, white papers, expert knowledge, etc. Our approach for the definition of the best practices takes advantage of that, and in this work we decided to collect recommendations from two reliable independent sources: the Center for Internet Security (CIS) [3] and the USA Department of Defense (DoD) [8] .
CIS has created a series of security configuration documents for several commercial and open source DBMS, namely: MySQL, SQLServer 2000/2005, and Oracle 8i/9i/10g. These documents focus on the practical aspects of the configuration of these DBMS and state the concrete values each configuration option should have in order to enhance overall security of real installations. The other document we used as source of security recommendations is the Database Security Technical Implementation Guide, version 8, release 1 [8] , developed by the Defense Information Systems Agency for the use within the USA Department of Defense. This document contains a series of requisites that the DoD employees must follow when installing a database to be used in the department.
The security best practices that support the benchmark are based on a detailed study and subsequent generalization of the recommendations stated in the set of documents mentioned above. For each recommended setting in each DBMS-specific CIS document, we identified the security property being targeted and analyzed the value and/or procedure recommended. This allowed us to determine the more general practice being addressed by each recommended setting. The DoD document is written in a generic form and is supposedly applicable to any DBMS engine. Several complementary best practices were found in this document, but the overlap of recommendations between the CIS documents and the DoD document was significative.
The complete list of security best practices identified is composed by 64 different security recommendations. Due to the lack of space we do not present the complete list of recommendations, but interested readers can find it at [2] .
Although the identification of the list of best practices is a key part of the work, it is obvious that some practices are more important than others in terms of the security gains they imply. We may define this importance as "how critical" it is to have the practice implemented. Grasping this criticality, however, is not an easy task, as the security perception might vary among persons and from one environment to another.
To tackle this problem we decided to use the consensual judgment of several experts through interviews. The expectation is that, in average, the most important practices are emphasized, even if there is no unanimity. The experts voted the importance of each individual practice using the following four values scale: 4-Critical to the system; 3-Important; 2-Advisable to implement; 1-Not much relevant. We then applied the values to a logarithmic scale and computed the individual percentage weights for each practice. Table 1 presents what we consider to be the top-14 of the best practices and their corresponding weights. Summed up, these best practices represent more than 50% of the total weight, while the other 50 practices account for the remaining percentage. In our opinion it is hard to establish a relative relation between security recommendations for the same reason that measuring security is hard. Therefore, we consider an average consensual weighting to be enough for the needs of the benchmark to provide the user with a recommended prioritization of his security problems. However, we must remember that the real relevance ordering is given by the DBA through the analysis of the threat vectors relevant to his environment.
DBMS threat vectors
Lists enumerating typical threats to DBMS are not as common as lists of security recommendations, and information related with real attacks is even harder to find. This due to the fact that administrators tend to follow a "security through obscurity" approach by hiding the occurrence of any successful attack events against their systems, as that would draw the attention to their weaknesses. What can be easily found is information regarding implementation bugs of real DBMS engines. However, we were not interested in this kind of information because fixing software defects in the DBMS is not the DBA's responsibility. In fact, these defects are not configuration problems and the only thing the DBA has to do is to install any patches that fix software defects as soon as possible (i.e., keep the DBMS software updated as recommended by best practice number 7 in Table 1 ).
The threat modeling methodology STRIDE [10] defines a set of threats vectors that are applicable to security in general. STRIDE is an acronym for six generally relevant security threats:
• Spoofing: threats that involve an entity using another identity that is not its own; • Tampering: threats that involve unauthorized modification of data or another part of the system; • Repudiation: threats involving the denial of performing an action; • Information disclosure: threats involving the exposition of information to an unauthorized entity; • Denial of service: threats that may lead a particular service to become unavailable to its users; • Elevation of privileges: threats that may lead an entity to obtain more privileges than it was originally supposed to have.
Although the STRIDE methodology defines an important set of threats, they cannot be used in our untrustworthiness benchmark because we need vectors that help administrators focusing on DBMS configurations aspects. In our opinion the STRIDE threat vectors are too generic for that.
This way, we conducted an extensive field search, and decided to include three more sources of information in our study: two protection profiles for databases from the Common Criteria evaluation methodology [6, 7] and a popular white paper [13] that presents a consensual "top 10" of database threats. These sources, including STRIDE, provided us a credible and representative set of threat vectors.
Orthogonality is an important aspect for the definition of the threat vectors. In fact, the vectors need to be as representative as possible of the relevant attack threats, but as orthogonal as possible among themselves. For instance, the white paper analyzed [13] proposes platform vulnerabilities as one of the top 10 database threats. However, from a DBMS configuration point of view, most platform vulnerabilities (like operating system vulnerabilities) are used as ways for illegitimally obtain privileges. Thus, such a vector clearly coincides with another very important threat vector defined in the same document, which is privilege elevation. These constraints together with a careful analysis of the documents mentioned above allowed us to define what we believe to be the eight more relevant DBMS configuration threat vectors. Table 2 presents those vectors, their definition and examples of insecurity practices related with them.
Mapping threats to configuration elements
Having established the set of security best practices and the relevant threat vectors, it is necessary to establish a relation between them. This relation defines which threat vectors are affected, directly or indirectly, by the application of the recommendations in practice. The problem of defining such relation is that, in one side we have static configuration characteristics of the environment, and in the other we have high-level threats that influence laterally the probability of the occurrence of real attacks. The difficulty arises from the fact that real attacks depend on several other conditions that have little to do with the static characteristics of the environment. For example, this difficulty is related aspects such as how to evaluate the overall security impact of applying (or not) recommendations like "separate development and production platforms" or "use a dedicated platform for the DBMS engine" in the cases where we have a complete lack of context. To create the mapping we need to assume a realistic scenario for each recommendation. In fact, to benchmark how untrustworthy a given configuration is, it is necessary to assume a scenario that portrays the most pessimistic consequences of not following the corresponding recommendation. It is important to recall that real individuals (and attackers) interact with the system by using one of the three possible interaction classes presented in Section 2 (application userid, OS userid, or DBMS userid). This is necessary because, to evaluate threats, we need to know how much access an attacker already has inside the system and that is defined by the environment where the attacker is contained (i.e., the interaction class he is using).
Finally, we need to evaluate all these elements (i.e., the pessimistic scenario, the malicious intent of attackers and the interaction classes) in the context of each threat vector. The goal is to verify if these elements together have, in any way, any probability of consummating the threat in a real attack. To better understand the idea, an example follows.
Consider the analysis of the recommendation "separate development and production platforms". In practice, this recommendation states that the server used by the developers to develop and test applications should not be the same that hosts the production data. A pessimistic scenario for the absence of this recommendation must include, at least, malicious developers that have the ability of executing untested and under development code on the production DBMS engine, and must assume that such code could access production data. Note that the security recommendation enables any code to be tested thoroughly before reaching production data, which may not happen when both environments coincide. The goal is to avoid the execution of malicious code in the production environment.
Given this pessimistic scenario we need to analyze the threat vectors from the point of view of the 3 interaction classes and also from the point of view of nonsystem users. First consider the Legitimate excessive privilege achievement vector (see Table 2 ). For each interaction class we should ask if the scenario enables "an increase of the probability that this user legitimaly obtains more privileges than it should". Clearly, a malicious code injection is not legitimate in any case, so there is no mapping between this best practice and this vector. Next, we should look to the second vector (Illegitimate privilege elevation) and ask if this scenario enables "an increased probability that a user obtains an arbitrary privilege which it should not have in any circumstances". Four points of view apply in this case:
• From the point of view of non-system users the answer to the question is yes, as the code injection could perform an authentication bypass, allowing a non-system user to access private data.
• From the point of view of an application userid, the answer is also yes, as the code could bypass privilege checks, augmenting the current userid privileges.
• From the point of view of an operating system userid, the answer is no, as it is not possible for application code under this specific scenario to cause an OS userid to elevate his privileges on the OS environment.
• For a DBMS userid the answer is yes again, as the code injection could have been performed over a stored procedure meant to control operations over tables (instead of using SQL directly). For a particular DBMS userid, the stored procedure could then Configuration characteristic that increases the probability of a user legitimaly obtaining more privileges than it should. E.g., granting privileges with ALL and ANY keywords, not implementing views to hide columns, using an administrator OS userid to execute the DBMS engine daemon Illegitimate privilege elevation (IllPrEl)
Configuration characteristic that increases the probability of a user obtaining an arbitrary privilege which he should not have in any circumstances. E.g., not using a dedicated platform, not patching the DBMS or OS software, not disabling unused protocols on the network stack
Denial of Service (DoS)
Configuration characteristic that increases the probability of a user being denied timely access to some functionality or resource. E.g.: not making and testing backups, storing log information in the OS partition, not properly setting OS file system privileges over DBMS data files
Configuration characteristic that increases the probability that a communication channel between a user and the server behaves in an unexpected way. E.g.: not encrypting a remote connection, using a default or self signed certificate for a server, placing production and development servers on the same network segment Authentication weakness (AuthW)
Configuration characteristic that increases the probability that an individual becomes authenticated to the system as another individual. E.g.: storing password information in clear, not forcing strong password policies, not excluding default userids, using host based authorization
Side-channel data exposure (SCDtEx)
Configuration characteristic that increases the probability that data is accessed through an alternative illegitimate access channel. E.g.: storing schema creation SQL files in the DBMS platform, not protecting backup files, not configuring access permissions of DBMS data files.
Audit trail weakness (AudTW)
Configuration characteristic which may yield a decreased ability of identifying unexpected behavior, its causes and possible suspects. E.g.: not auditing sensitive information, not protecting log files, not auditing application code changes
SQL Injection enhancement (SQLIE)
Configuration characteristic that increases the probability that an SQL injection vulnerability becomes exposed or enhanced. E.g.: not disabling DBMS extensions that allow file system operations, not implementing least privileges policies, not protecting application code.
behave in a malicious way and allow increasing privileges. This way, the final mapping of the security best practice "separate development and production platforms" over the Legitimate excessive privilege achievement is empty, and over the Illegitimate privilege elevation is composed by the three interaction classes: application userid, DBMS userid and the nonsystem users. The same process repeats for all remaining threat vectors and for all other security best practices. The final result is a three dimensions matrix relating security best practices, threat vectors, and interaction classes.
The untrustworthiness computation
Applying the benchmark on a real environment consists of verifying which security best practices are being actively fulfilled. The evaluation process is guided by the DBA, and progress as follows: for each security recommendation he evaluates if it is being applied to the system. Three situations are possible:
• He clearly verifies that the recommendation is being applied; • He clearly verifies that the recommendation is not being applied, either because he never knew he should apply it or he could not apply it; • He does not know or is not sure if the recommendation is being applied. The reason for that might be one of the following: the DBA does not understand the idea or what it involves; he does not know how to check if it is being implemented; or the recommendation was left in charge of someone that the DBA cannot trust. The outcome however is one of two: either the practice is being applied or the DBA must assume it is not. The computation of the minimum untrustworthiness is done first over each threat vector by applying the mapping (see previous section). For each best practice that maps with a given threat vector for some interaction class, if this practice is not being followed we sum the weight of this best practice for this vector. After calculating this for all threat vectors, then a general minimum untrustworthiness index of the installation is computed. Afterwards, the sum computed for each vector is divided by the sum of the weights of all practices that have some interaction class with it. The general index is kept as is. This procedure provides a value, in percentage, which expresses for each threat vector what is its minimum untrustworthiness value.
Finally, the minimum untrustworthiness is computed for each of the interaction classes and nonsystem users as follows: for each class, we select all the best practices that map with it for at least one of the threat vectors. From this list, we obtain the untrustworthiness value by dividing the sum of the weights of the practices that are not implemented by the sum of all weights. This procedure can also be done relatively to each threat vector to obtain the untrustworthiness value of interaction classes against each threat.
The procedure results in 13 distinct minimum untrustworthiness values (and 32 more if the computation for each interaction class is done against each vector) that can be used by the DBA to evaluate the configuration areas and threats that are justifiably more prone to the appearance of successful attacks.
The impact of alternative configurations can be analyzed using the benchmark. To evaluate a particular modification change, the DBA can hypothetically assume that he implements the associated best practice. When the benchmark is executed again with such hypothetical change, the minimum untrustworthiness values change accordingly, and the difference from the new values to the original values allow the DBA to evaluate if the impact of implementing (or dropping) a particular recommendation is worthwhile to his particular needs.
Preliminary example
In this section we provide a preliminary example of the definition and execution of an untrustworthiness benchmark in real installations. In this preliminary example the benchmark is defined by: 1. The top 5 best practices that are presented in first five rows of Table 1 and the corresponding relative weights (see [2] for details); 2. The threat vectors presented in Table 2 . 3. The mapping between threat vectors and configuration elements is presented on Table 4 . This mapping is based on the pessimistic scenarios presented in Table 3 and uses the following key to identify the interaction classes userids related with each threat vector: A=application; O=operating system; D=DBMS; N=non-system user. We evaluated four real database installations using the benchmark. Some relevant characteristics of each installation can be found in Table 5 , but more details of each one can be found in [1] . The minimum untrustworthiness result for each case is presented in Table 6 . Although the data is very restricted, some interesting patterns can be observed. First, all installations present the same untrustworthiness in regard to SQL Injection enhancement (SQLiE). However, when considering authentication weaknesses (AuthW) we can see that Case 3 has a MU of 100%, being highly untrustworthy. Based on the particular needs of the environment the DBA can decide if tackling this aspect should be a priority or not. If it is a priority for the environment then this is probably the area in which the DBA should focus first. The DBA of Case 1, however, would tackle SQL injection threats first, as it is the more distrustful value. The same goes for the DBA of Case 2, especially because the installation has 54 different applications where such vulnerabilities could manifest (probably making it a top-1 priority). 
Conclusions & future work
In this paper, we proposed an insecurity metric that can be used to evaluate the minimum untrustworthiness of DBMS configurations called. This metric portrays how much distrusted must a DBA be that a given configuration will be able to prevent attacks. Minimum untrustworthiness is computed based on the eight more relevant threats to database configurations. The threats can be used by DBAs to prioritize the resolution of the eventual security problems of the installation, taking into consideration its needs and characteristics.
We also proposed an approach to define an untrustworthiness benchmark capable of systematically computing the minimum untrustworthiness of a DBMS configuration. We discussed the problems related with the definition of the DBMS components, and proposed ways to solve them. Finally, we presented a preliminary benchmark based on 5 security recommendations, and used it to evaluate four different real installations.
Preliminary results suggest that a minimum untrustworthiness benchmark is very useful. It helps prioritizing concerns and understanding the particularities of the environment. Future work includes the definition of a complete benchmark, identifying ways to continuously update the benchmark (to keep it up-to-date in terms of security practices and threats) and its application to several more real installations in order to confirm the preliminary results and validate minimum untrustworthiness results in the field. 
